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Abstract
Agent Platforms are the software that supports the development and execution of Multi-agent Systems. There
are many Agent Platforms developed by the agent community, but they hardly consider privacy. This leads
to agent-based applications that invade users’ privacy. Privacy can be threatened by two main information
activities: information collection and information processing. Information collection can be prevented using
traditional security mechanisms. Information processing can be prevented by minimizing data identifiability,
i.e., the degree by which personal information can be directly attributed to a particular individual. How-
ever, minimizing data identifiability may directly affect other crucial issues in Multi-agent Systems, such as
accountability, trust, and reputation. In this paper, we present the support that the Magentix2 Agent Plat-
form provides for preserving privacy. Specifically, It provides mechanisms to avoid information collection and
information processing when they are not desired. Moreover, Magentix2 provides these mechanisms without
compromising accountability, trust, and reputation. We also provide in this paper an application built on top
of Magentix2 that exploits its support for preserving privacy. Finally, we provide an extensive evaluation of
the support that Magentix2 provides for preserving privacy based on that application. We specifically test
whether or not privacy loss can be minimized by using the support that Magentix2 provides, whether or not
this support introduces a bearable performance overhead, and whether or not existing trust and reputation
models can be implemented on top of Magentix2.
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1. Introduction
A Multiagent System (MAS) consists of a number
of agents that interact with one-another [1]. MAS
represents a key issue, especially from the develop-
ment point of view in Distributed Artificial Intelli-
gence (DAI). This is because the MAS community has
INOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was
accepted for publication in Engineering Applications of Arti-
ficial Intelligence. Changes resulting from the publishing pro-
cess, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural for-
matting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be re-
flected in this document. Changes may have been made to
this work since it was submitted for publication. A defini-
tive version was subsequently published: Jose M. Such, Ana
Garcia-Fornes, Agustin Espinosa and Joan Bellver. Magen-
tix2: a Privacy-enhancing Agent Platform. Engineering Ap-
plications of Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 26 N. 1 pp. 96-109
(2013). http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0952197612001522
produced both methodologies and actual frameworks
to make the implementation of agent-based applica-
tions possible. In particular, Agent Platforms (APs)
are the software that supports the development and
execution of MAS. APs provide all the basic infras-
tructure (for message handling, tracing and monitor-
ing, run-time management, and so on) required to
create MAS [1].
There are many APs developed by the MAS com-
munity – for an overview of current APs and the fea-
tures they provide refer to [2]. However, privacy is
seldom considered [3, 4]. This leads to agent-based
applications that invade individuals’ privacy. This
is due to the fact that an agent usually encapsu-
lates personal information describing its principal1
[5], such as preferences, names, and other informa-
1In this paper, we use the terms principal and user indis-
tinctly to refer to the user that the agent is acting on behalf
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tion. Moreover, agents carry out interactions on be-
half of their principals so that they exchange personal
information. For instance, agents act on behalf of
their principals in agent-mediated e-commerce [6], as
personal assistants [7], in virtual worlds like Second
Life2 [8], as recommenders [9], and so on.
The modern conception of privacy started more
than a hundred years ago, with the seminal work of
Warren & Brandeis [10] The right of privacy. These
two lawyers defined privacy as “the right to be let
alone”. They were pioneers in considering the impli-
cations of technology in privacy. Specifically, they
were very concerned about the implications of in-
stantaneous photographs and portraits in injuring the
feelings of the people in those photographs and por-
traits. Privacy was later recognized as a fundamental
human right by the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, and many other international
treaties [11].
In the second part of the twentieth century, Alan
Westin defined privacy as “the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated” [12]. This is what is currently
known as the informational self-determination right
[13]. The concept of informational self-determination
changed the right to privacy from the right to be
let alone to its current incarnation as a means to
limit the abuse of personal data [14]. Informational
self-determination represents today’s European un-
derstanding and regulation of privacy in the context
of information and communication technology (EU
Directives 95/46/EC, 45/2001/EC, and 2002/58/EC).
Despite all these regulations, as the Internet has
no governing or regulating body, privacy breaches are
still possible. Nowadays, in the era of global connec-
tivity (everything is inter-connected anytime and ev-
erywhere) with more than 2 billion world-wide users
with connection to the Internet as of 20113, privacy
is of great concern. In the real world, everyone de-
cides (at least implicitly) what to tell other people
about themselves. In the digital world, users have
more or less lost effective control over their personal
of. Principals are also called agent owners, or simply users in
the related literature.
2http://secondlife.com/
3http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm to con-
sult updated statistics on world Internet users and population.
data. Users are therefore exposed to constant per-
sonal data collection and processing without even be-
ing aware of it [15]. Garfinkel [16] suggests that nowa-
days users have only one option to preserve their pri-
vacy: becoming hermits and not using online social
networks, e-commerce sites, etc. Considering the in-
creasing power and sophistication of computer ap-
plications that offer many advantages to individuals,
becoming a hermit may not really be an option. How-
ever, all of these advantages come at a significant loss
of privacy [17]. Recent studies show that 90% of users
are concerned or very concerned about privacy [18].
Moreover, almost 95% of web users admitted they
have declined to provide personal information to web
sites at one time or another when asked [19].
In this paper, we describe the support that the
Magentix24 AP provides for preserving privacy. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the main concepts treated in this
article. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the Ma-
gentix2 AP. Section 4 presents the support that Ma-
gentix2 provides for avoiding information processing.
Section 5 presents the support that Magentix2 pro-
vides for avoiding information collection. Section 6
presents an application that takes advantage of the
support for preserving privacy that Magentix2 pro-
vides. Section 7 presents the evaluation we carried
out. Section 8 presents related relevant works. Fi-
nally, Section 9 presents some concluding remarks
and future work.
2. Background
In this paper we consider two information-related
activities that can represent a major threat for pri-
vacy: information collection and information process-
ing [13, 4]. These activities can lead to many privacy
breaches [20]. We now introduce both activities and
outline how these activities can be prevented when
they are not desired. We also detail the implications
that preventing these activities may have in account-
ability, trust, and reputation.
2.1. Information Collection
Information collection refers to the process of gath-
ering and storing data about an individual. Personal
data is transferred on-line even across the Internet.
4http://magentix2.gti-ia.upv.es
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Without appropriate protection mechanisms a poten-
tial attacker could easily obtain information about
principals without their consent. For instance, an
attacker can be listening to transferred information
over the network (files, messages, e-mails, etc) and
simply gather the information flowing in the network
[21]. Moreover, the attacker could even use the infor-
mation it gathers about an individual to impersonate
her/his, which is known as identity theft [22]. For
instance, in [23] the authors present how to clone an
existing account in an online social network and to
establish a friendship connection with the victim in
order to obtain information about her/him.
In order to avoid undesired information collection,
sensitive personal information must be protected from
access by any other third party that is different from
the agent to which the information is directed to.
Therefore, avoiding information collection requires se-
curity to control the access to personal information
[24]. In particular, confidentiality is a security prop-
erty of a system that ensures the prevention of unau-
thorized reading of information [25]. In distributed
environments, confidentiality usually means that sen-
sitive information is encrypted into a piece of data so
that only parties that can decrypt that piece of data
can access the sensitive information.
Confidentiality can be achieved by using existing
secure data transfer technologies such as Kerberos
[26], SSL [27], and TLS [28]. These technologies al-
low the encryption of messages before transferring
them and the decryption of messages once they are
received. As a result, if an agent A sends a message
to an agent B using these technologies, A is sure that
B will be the only one able to read this message.
Confidentiality is a necessary condition to pre-
serve privacy, but it is not sufficient. It prevents
undesired information collection from unauthorized
third parties. If an agent A sends personal informa-
tion to an agent B in a confidential fashion, exter-
nal third parties will not be able to access it. How-
ever, agent B will obviously receive this personal in-
formation. The point is that agent B can then pro-
cess the received personal information, unless specific
measures for preventing information processing are
adopted before sending this information.
2.2. Information Processing
Information processing refers to the use or trans-
formation of data that has already been collected [29],
even though this information has been collected by
mutual consent between two parties. An example of
information processing is profiling [30]: “the process
of ’discovering’ patterns in data that can be used to
identify or represent a human or nonhuman subject
(individual or group) and/or the application of pro-
files (sets of correlated data) to individuate and repre-
sent an individual subject or to identify a subject as a
member of a group (which can be an existing commu-
nity or a discovered category) and/or the application
of profiles to individuate and represent individuals or
groups”.
One of the most common types of profiling is
called buyer profiling in e-commerce environments,
in which vendors obtain detailed profiles of their cus-
tomers and tailor their offers regarding customers’
tastes. These profiles can represent a serious threat
to privacy. For instance, these profiles can be used
to perform price discrimination [31]. Vendors could
charge customers different prices for the same good
according to the customers’ profiles, i.e., if a vendor
knows that some good is of great interest to one cus-
tomer, the vendor could charge this customer more
money for this good than other customers for the
same good. For instance, in 2000, Amazon started to
charge customers different prices for the same DVD
titles [32]. When the story became public, Amazon
claimed that this was part of a simple price test and
discontinued this practice. Another example of pri-
vacy threat due to the use of these profiles is what is
known as poor judgment [33]. This is when individ-
uals are judged and subsequently treated according
to decisions made automatically based on incorrect
or partial personal data. For instance, companies
usually divide their potential customers into similar
groups based on customers’ characteristics (known as
customer segmentation). This practice can lead to ex-
clusion of people from services based on potentially
distorted judgments [29].
Most of the work on protecting against the pro-
cessing of information already collected is based on
minimizing data identifiability. Identifiability can be
defined as “the degree to which (personal) data can
be directly linked to an individual” [29]. The de-
gree of privacy of a system is inversely related to the
degree of user data identifiability. The more identifi-
able data that exists about a person, the less she/he
is able to control access to information about her-
self/himself, and the greater the privacy risks. Identi-
fiability ranges from complete identifiability to anonymity.
Pseudonymity [34] is the use of pseudonyms as
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identifiers. A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject
other than one of the subject’s real names. Pseudonyms
have been broadly used by human beings in the real
world. For instance, in the 19th century when writ-
ing was a male-dominated profession, some female
writers used male names for their writings. Nowa-
days, in the digital world, there is a great number
of pseudonyms such as usernames, nicknames, e-mail
addresses, sequence numbers, public keys, etc. [35].
The most important trait of pseudonymity is that
it comprises all degrees of identifiability of a subject
(from identified to anonymous) depending on the na-
ture of the pseudonyms being used. Complete iden-
tification is when the linking between a pseudonym
and its holder is publicly known. Anonymity can
be achieved by using a different pseudonym for each
different interaction. This is known as transaction
pseudonyms [34]. For instance, let us suppose that
two agents A and B act as a buyer and a seller, re-
spectively, in a e-marketplace. Agent A can use a dif-
ferent pseudonym (e.g. a random generated numeric
identifier) for each specific interaction with agent B.
Hence, Agent B collects information about the in-
teractions performed but is unable to relate different
interactions to each other or relate any of these inter-
actions to agent A5.
As we detail later on in this paper (Section 4),
Magentix2 allows agents to use as many pseudonyms
as they need to prevent information processing. We
refer to these pseudonyms as regular pseudonyms.
2.3. Implications in Accountability
Minimizing data identifiability may have a direct
impact on accountability. Accountability refers to
the ability to hold entities responsible for their ac-
tions [38]. Accountability usually requires an unam-
biguous identification of the principal involved [39].
5Even when buyer agents are able to change its pseudonym,
purchases may include information that can be used to relate
different purchases to each other and to the buyer agent, e.g.,
the credit card number to perform the payments and the ship-
ment address may be the same for different transactions. We
assume that payments are carried out using some kind of anony-
mous payment mechanism and deliveries are carried out using
some anonymous delivery system. Hence, credit card numbers
and delivery addresses do not need to be disclosed when an
agent acquires a product. For instance, the untraceable elec-
tronic cash presented by Chaum et al. [36] can be used for
anonymous payments. For anonymous deliveries, the privacy-
preserving physical delivery system presented by Aı¨meur et al.
[37] can be used.
Then, this principal can be held liable for their acts.
For instance, a buyer agent pays a seller agent for
a good. The seller commits to shipping the good to
the customer agent’s principal. In the event that the
customer agent’s principal does not receive the good,
the seller agent’s principal6 may be held liable for
this. Although determining exactly who should be
held liable for this depends on the applicable laws in
the specific country, it usually requires the identifica-
tion of the seller agent’s principal. Then, the seller
agent’s principal can be sued for fraud.
Many systems (such as commercial systems) em-
phasize accountability because, in these environments,
principals can be subject to serious losses such as
money loss. Moreover, the sense of impunity gener-
ated by the lack of accountability could even encour-
age abuse. Thus, accountability is of crucial impor-
tance for agent-based applications because it helps to
promote trust in these applications, which is needed
for principals to be willing to engage with and dele-
gate tasks to agents [42].
Pseudonyms can be utilized to implement account-
ability [43]. However, this implies that there is a
trusted entity that issues pseudonyms and knows the
association between pseudonyms and the real identity
of the principal that is behind an agent. Therefore,
when an agent misbehaves using a given pseudonym,
this pseudonym can be traced back to the principal
behind this agent for law enforcement. One approach
to do this would be that the AP is the one that is-
sues pseudonyms. Therefore, the AP itself can dis-
close the principal behind the pseudonym, removing
pseudonymity and producing identity and account-
ability as a result. The main drawback of this ap-
proach is that the AP itself knows the relation of
pseudonyms to each other and to the principal in-
volved. As APs are usually to be run by the same
company that hosts the specific system (e.g. eBay),
information processing could still be easy. We think
that decoupling the place in which the identities are
issued and the place in which the identities are ef-
fectively used can make this harder. Therefore, we
6Software entities (intelligent agents, virtual organizations,
etc.) cannot have real identities because, until now, they could
not be held liable for their acts in front of the law. However,
this may change in the future if they finally achieve some kind
of legal personhood, as suggested by [40] and [41]. In this case,
software entities may be provided with legal personhood to be
(partially) held liable for their acts. The point is that according
to the law, someone must be liable for frauds like this.
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consider that pseudonyms are issued and validated
by external trusted third parties (as explained later
on in Section 4) that do not participate in any way
in the specific system.
2.4. Implications in Trust and Reputation
There is also the need to equip agents with models
to reason about and assess trust towards other agents
and their reputation in a MAS [5]. These models al-
low agents to select the best and most reliable part-
ners in a specific situation and to avoid partners of
previous unsuccessful interactions. Trust and repu-
tation are even more important in open systems, in
which previously unknown parties may interact. For
instance, if a buyer agent enters into an e-marketplace
for the first time, it will need to choose among all of
the available seller agents. As the buyer agent has no
previous interactions with the seller agent, the rep-
utation of the seller agent in the e-marketplace can
play a crucial role for the buyer agent to choose an
specific seller agent.
The agent community has developed a vast num-
ber of trust and reputation models [44, 45]. How-
ever, current trust and reputation models are based
on the assumption that identities are long-lived, so
that ratings about a particular agent from the past
are related to the same agent in the future. How-
ever, when such models are actually used in real do-
mains this assumption is no longer valid and the so-
called identity-related vulnerabilities emerge. These
vulnerabilities can be exploited by means of white-
washing attacks [46] (also called change of identities
[47]). For instance, an agent that has a low reputation
due to its cheating behavior may be really interested
in changing its identity and restarting its reputation
from scratch. These vulnerabilities can also be ex-
ploited by means of sybil attacks [48]. An example
of this attack could be an agent that holds multiple
identities in a marketplace and attempts to sell the
same product through each of them, increasing the
probability of being chosen by a potential buyer.
Due to the identity-related vulnerabilities of trust
and reputation models, malicious agents may be able
to modify the expected behavior of trust and repu-
tation models. As a result, these reputation models
may become completely useless. For instance, in our
previous example, a seller agent may be able to cheat
the reputation model used by the buyer agent. Thus,
the buyer agent may end up interacting with a ma-
licious agent instead of what it believes a reputable
agent. These has the potential to cause many dam-
ages such as money lose. Therefore, these vulnerabil-
ities have the potential to place the whole system in
jeopardy.
A possible solution for these vulnerabilities is the
use of once-in-a-lifetime pseudonyms [49]. Agents
can only hold one once-in-a-lifetime pseudonym in
each marketplace. Therefore, they cannot get rid of
the trust and reputation ratings they got from other
agents in the marketplace. However, minimizing data
identifiability requires that agents have the ability to
hold and use many pseudonyms. Thus, it could seem
that a system that allows the prevention of informa-
tion processing may have important difficulties to also
prevent identity-related vulnerabilities.
To address this, Magentix2 bases on the agent
identity model proposed in [50], as we explain later
on in Section 4. Agents in Magentix2 can hold two
kinds of pseudonyms: permanent pseudonyms (that
correspond to once-in-a-lifetime pseudonyms), which
avoid identity-related vulnerabilities; and regular pseudonyms,
which agents can use without any limitation in num-
ber to obtain their desired degree of privacy.
3. The Magentix2 Agent Platform
Magentix27 is an AP that focuses on providing
support for open MAS. Magentix2 provides support
at three levels, as suggested in [51]: (i) organization
level: technologies and techniques related to agent
societies; (ii) interaction level: technologies and tech-
niques related to communications between agents; and
(iii) agent level: technologies and techniques related
to individual agents (such as reasoning and learning).
In this paper we focus on the technologies that
Magentix2 provides at interaction level to enhance
the privacy of the applications that are developed and
executed on top of it. Firstly, we briefly introduce the
Magentix2 agent communication mechanism in order
for the reader to have a bird’s-eye view of the sys-
tem. Then, we thoroughly describe the support that
Magentix2 provides to avoid information processing
and information collection in Sections 4 and 5 respec-
tively.
7http://users.dsic.upv.es/grupos/ia/sma/tools/
magentix2/index.php
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3.1. Agent Communication
Magentix2 uses AMQP8 [52] as a foundation for
agent communication. This standard facilitates the
interoperability between heterogeneous entities. Ma-
gentix2 allows heterogeneous agents to interact with
each other via messages that are represented following
the FIPA-ACL [53] standard, which are exchanged
using the AMQP standard.
Magentix2 uses the Apache Qpid9 open-source im-
plementation of AMQP for Agent Communication.
Apache Qpid provides two AMQP servers, implemented
in C++ (the one we use) and Java. Qpid also pro-
vides AMQP Client APIs that support the following
languages: C++, Java, C# .NET, Ruby, and Python.
Qpid allows distributed applications made up of dif-
ferent parts written in any of these languages to com-
municate with each other. What is more, any client
that is developed using one of the Qpid Client APIs
is able to communicate with any client that is devel-
oped using any other AMQP-compliant API via any
AMQP server implementation, as long as both server
and clients implement the same version of the AMQP
standard.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the Magentix2 agent
communication architecture. Magentix2 is composed
by one or more (in this case federated) AMQP Servers
(QPid brokers). Magentix2 agents act as AMQP Clients
(using Qpid Client APIs) that connect to the Qpid
broker and are then able to communicate with each
other. Magentix2 agents can be located in any In-
ternet location, they only need to know the host on
which the Qpid broker (or one of the federated Qpid
brokers) is running.
Magentix2 provides a Java library, which is called
the Magentix2 Agent Library (MAL), to facilitate the
development of agents. This API allows agent pro-
grammers to focus on creating FIPA-ACL messages
and sending and receiving them, without dealing di-
rectly with the Qpid Client Java API. Currently, this
API is only written in Java, but the existence of
multiple QPid Client APIs for several programming
languages enables the development of agents written
in different programming languages. Moreover, any
proprietary implementation that follows both AMQP
and FIPA-ACL standards would be interoperable with
Magentix2 agents.
8http://www.amqp.org/
9http://qpid.apache.org/
Figure 1: Magentix2 Agent Comunication Architecture
4. Protection against Information Processing
As we detailed in section 2, information process-
ing can be minimized by minimizing data identifi-
ability, i.e., using many pseudonyms (even complete
anonymity can be achieve by using a different pseudonym
for each interaction). However, this introduces prob-
lems regarding accountability, trust and reputation.
We describe in this section the support that Ma-
gentix2 provides for avoiding information processing
but preserving accountability and avoiding identity-
related vulnerabilities of trust and reputation models.
The building block of the Magentix2 support for
avoiding information processing is how it manages the
identities of the agents. In particular,the agent iden-
tity management in Magentix2 is based on the partial
identities model presented in [50]. In a nutshell and
informally speaking, a partial identity can be seen as
a set of attributes that identifies an entity in a given
context. They are composed of a pseudonym that is
unique within a context and other attributes that de-
scribe the entity within that context (roles, location,
preferences, etc.).
Magentix2 considers two kinds of partial identi-
ties:
• Regular Partial Identities (RPIs) A RPI
must contain a regular pseudonym. Agents have
no limitation in the number of regular pseudonyms
that they are able to hold in a given system.
Thus, agents can hold as many as RPIs as they
need to achieve they desired data identifiability
level. For instance, an agent could use a differ-
ent RPI in each interaction to achieve anonymity.
• Permanent Partial Identities (PPIs) must
contain a permanent pseudonym (once-in-a-lifetime
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pseudonym). An agent can only hold one per-
manent pseudonym for a given system. Thus, if
trust and reputation is established trough PPIs,
identity-related vulnerabilities of trust and rep-
utation are avoided. This is because an agent
can only hold one PPI in a given system.
Although both kinds of partial identities enable
trust and reputation relationships, only PPIs guaran-
tee that identity-related vulnerabilities are avoided.
Therefore, agents will choose to establish trust and
reputation through PPIs if they want to avoid identity-
related vulnerabilities. However, if they want to avoid
information processing, they can use as many RPIs
as needed. For instance, in an e-marketplace a seller
agent could be very interested in interacting with
buyer agents using a PPI. This is because buyer agents
would know that the seller agent is not able to per-
form attacks that exploit identity-vulnerabilities, e.g.,
the seller agent is not able to change its PPI. However,
a buyer agent can be very interested in using a differ-
ent RPI each time it interacts with a seller agent, so
that the seller agent is not able to make a profile of
the buyer agent’s tastes and then use this profile to
perform practices such as price discrimination, poor
judgement, etc.
Magentix2 also considers the concept of real iden-
tities. Real identities identify entities that can be li-
able for their acts in front of the law, such as human
beings, companies, etc. Real identities are used for
accountability concerns such as law enforcement. For
this reason, real identities are restricted to only le-
gal persons. A real identity, for example, would be:
Bob Andrew Miller, born in Los Angeles, CA, USA
on July 7, 1975. Agents might also have a real iden-
tity for accountability concerns if they finally achieve
some kind of legal personality, as suggested by [40]
and [41]. In the event of this, the support that Ma-
gentix2 provides would not need any modification.
4.1. Identity Management Architecture
Magentix2 complies with the client part of the
Identity Metasystem Interoperability standard10. This
standard specifies the interfaces for the secure web
services provided by User-Centric Privacy-Enhancing
Identity Management Systems [54]. These systems
10http://docs.oasis-open.org/imi/identity/v1.0/
identity.html
support the process of management of partial identi-
ties. In particular, they provide the following facili-
ties:
• Identity Providers (IdPs), which issue par-
tial identities and validate these identities to
other Relying Parties.
• Relying Parties, which are a set of APIs for
verifying partial identities against an Identity
Provider.
• Identity Selectors, which provide a simple
way to manage partial identities and choose which
partial identity to use in a given context.
• Attribute Services, which allow the specifi-
cation of access control rights of relying parties
over the attributes in a partial identity.
Figure 2: The Magentix2 agent identity management architec-
ture.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the Magentix2 agent
identity management support. As one can observe,
Magentix2 components act as clients of IdPs. The
Magentix2 Agent Library (MAL) implements clients
for Identity Selectors, Relying Parties, and Attribute
Services. Therefore, agents in Magentix2 can select
the partial identity to use in a given interaction, ver-
ify the partial identities of other agents, and specify
access control for attributes in their partial identities.
We can also see in Figure 2 that there is another
component of Magentix2 that is called the Magentix2
Management Service (MMS). The MMS is a secure
web service that acts as a Relying Party, i.e., it is able
to request IdPs to verify partial identities. The MMS
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is in charge of dynamically signing digital certificates
for agents to communicate to each other in a confiden-
tial fashion, and thus, avoiding information collection
from unauthorized parties (as detailed in section 5).
Agents request the signing of digital certificates to
the MMS using one of their partial identities. The
MMS must verify the partial identity that the agent
used before signing the digital certificate.
IdPs are classified according to the type of par-
tial identities they issue. The Permanent Identity
Provider (PIdP) is an IdP (or a federation of IdPs11)
that issues PPIs to the agents taking part in the spe-
cific marketplace. Agents must register using a real
identity that the PIdP will not reveal to other agents
or to Magentix2. The PIdP is also in charge of forcing
agents to only hold a single PPI in this specific mar-
ketplace. Moreover, an agent is able to know when it
validates a partial identity of another agent that this
partial identity is effectively a PPI so that the sec-
ond agent cannot change it and is unable to perform
identity-related attacks.
Regular Identity Providers (RIdPs) issue RPIs to
agents. Agents request RPIs by providing either a
real identity, or a PPI that RIdPs will not reveal to
others. There is no limitation in the number of RIdPs
per marketplace or in the number of RPIs per agent
and per marketplace.
4.2. Obtaining Partial Identities
We now detail the dynamics of agent identity man-
agement in Magentix2. Users provide their real iden-
tity when they launch an agent. This real identity is
only used by the local instance of the MAL. There-
fore, it is only in the local computer of the user that
launches the agent. Moreover, the API offered by
the MAL allows the user to choose an identity for
the newly created agent. Then, the MAL calls to a
PIdP/RIdP to obtain a PPI/RPI. From then on, and
11User-Centric Identity Management Systems support
the federation of IdPs that belong to the same and also
different remote security domains across the Internet. There-
fore, a PIdP can be implemented as a federation of IdPs
instead of only one IdP, minimizing the typical draw-
backs of a centralized trusted third party, such as being
a single point of failure (SPOF) and a possible efficiency
bottleneck. Examples of identity federation standards are
the Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework http:
//projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/
liberty_alliance_id_ff_1_2_specifications/ and WS-
Federation http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/
specification/ws-fed/.
as we will explain in section 5, the agent can use this
PPI/RPI to interact with other agents.
The important point is that neither Magentix2
nor the agents running in Magentix2 have access to
the real identity of the user. They are only able to
know the PPI/RPI that the agent is using. In case of
law enforcement, a court could ask IdPs to disclose
the real identity behind a particular PPI/RPI. Thus,
accountability is preserved.
Whenever an agent wants to change its RPI (re-
call that PPIs cannot be changed), it only needs to
call to the MAL API. Then, this API will be in charge
of contacting the appropriate RIdP and obtaining a
new RPI.
Figure 3: An example of the Partial Identities of an agent.
Figure 3 shows an example of an agent and its
partial identities. The agent’s principal has a real
identity with an attribute name Adam John Wilkes.
Using this real identity, the agent has obtained a PPI
from the PIdP that includes two attributes: pseudonym
A and role seller. This entity has also obtained N
RPIs from N different RIdPs. Some of the RPIs are
obtained by providing a PPI (such as RPI 1, with
pseudonym agent1 and role buyer) and other RPIs
are obtained using a real identity (such as RPI N,
with pseudonym agentN and role buyer).
5. Protection against Information Collection
In this section, we detail the support that Magen-
tix2 provides for avoiding information collection. As
we explained in Section 2, information collection by
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unauthorized parties can be avoided by means of con-
fidentiality. Therefore, we explain in this section how
Magentix2 makes agent communications confidential.
Moreover, we detail how this confidential agent com-
munication integrates with the agent identity man-
agement model presented in the previous section.
Agent communication in Magentix2 is based on
AMQP. The AMQP standard specifies secure com-
munication by tunneling AMQP connections through
SSL [27] (so-called AMQPS). Apache Qpid imple-
ments SSL support for AMQP. SSL authenticates
communicating parties based on digital certificates.
Thus, it needs a configured Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI). The Magentix2 PKI is set during installa-
tion time. Firstly, the Magentix2 certificate authority
(MCA) is created. Secondly, certificates for the Ma-
gentix2 Management Service (MMS) and the Qpid
Broker are created using this certificate authority.
Digital certificates for agents are created automat-
ically by the MAL and dynamically signed by the
MCA through the MMS at execution time (as de-
scribed below).
The MMS is a front-end of the MCA. It is imple-
mented as a secure web service. The MMS is in charge
of dynamically signing digital certificates for agents,
which can use these certificates to communicate se-
curely. The MMS service needs two inputs: the agent
pseudonym and a non-signed digital certificate. The
first input is the pseudonym in the permanent or reg-
ular partial identity (issued by a permanent or regular
IdP) that the agent uses to invoke the MMS. The sec-
ond input is a non-signed certificate that contains the
agent’s public key (this is the certificate that is to be
signed). The agent key pair (private and public key)
and this certificate are created by the MAL locally
for each agent and for each new partial identity.
The MMS produces one output: the digital cer-
tificate signed by the MCA. The MMS produces this
output after: (i) verifying that the pseudonym is the
same as the one in the partial identity used to in-
voke the secure web service; (ii) verifying the partial
identity against the IdP that issued it; (iii) and fi-
nally signing the certificate using the MCA. Agents
can then use this signed certificate to communicate
to other Magentix2 agents.
The AMQP connection of every agent to the Qpid
broker is tunneled through SSL. Hence, the commu-
nication between two Magentix2 agents is provided
with confidentiality and integrity out of the box. To
ensure the authenticity of the sender pseudonym in a
FIPA-ACL message (recall that in Magentix2 FIPA-
ACL messages are encapsulated into AMQP mes-
sages), an agent must verify that the pseudonym of
the sender in the AMQP sender message field is the
same as the pseudonym of the sender in the FIPA-
ACL sender message field upon receiving a new mes-
sage. This is performed automatically by the Magen-
tix2 agent library.
Each time an agent obtains a new partial iden-
tity (RPI or PPI) as described in Section 4, the MAL
repeats the process for obtaining a MCA-signed cer-
tificate. This certificate is for the agent to communi-
cate in a confidential fashion when it uses this par-
tial identity. Moreover, agents can also choose the
partial identity to be used in each communication.
Therefore, the MAL is in charge of using each time
the certificate that corresponds to the partial identity
that the agent intends to use.
Figure 4 shows an example of an agent that holds
a RPI with two attributes: the pseudonym A, and the
role buyer. The MAL automatically creates a certifi-
cate that contains the pseudonym A and calls to the
MMS using the agent’s RPI. The MMS validates the
RPI to the IdP that issued it. Then, it signs the cer-
tificate using the MCA and sends back the signed cer-
tificate to the A agent. From this moment on, when
the A agent sends a message, the MAL automatically
send this message trough an AMQPS connection es-
tablished with the signed certificate received from the
MMS. Thus, agent A can communicate with agent B
in a confidential fashion.
6. Application to an Agent-based E-marketplace
for Wines
In this section, we detail an application built on
top of Magentix2. It is an agent-based e-commerce
application. Agent-mediated e-commerce [42, 6] refers
to electronic commerce in which agent technologies
are applied to provide personalized, continuously run-
ning, semi-autonomous behavior. In agent-mediated
e-commerce, agents can be distributed among dif-
ferent remote locations over the Internet. For in-
stance, buyer agents mostly act as personal assis-
tants that usually run on a local mobile/personal de-
vice/computer and interact with other seller agents
that usually run in remote servers.
Agents partially or fully automate some of the
processes involved in e-commerce, providing one or
more of the following (and also other) facilities [42]:
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Figure 4: Secure Agent Communication (information collection avoidance).
• find, recommend and compare products, ven-
dors, or services;
• participate in electronic markets and negotiate
the price/terms of transactions or contracts with
other participants;
• perform transactions on behalf of their users;
• track the user’s interests and offer personalized
services;
• monitor conditions and provide notifications;
• retrieve, filter, and mine information and knowl-
edge;
• produce and deliver e-services, such as informa-
tion gathering, processing and management.
In agent-based e-commerce, agents encapsulate
personal information describing their principals [42].
They usually have a detailed profile of their princi-
pals’ names, preferences, roles in organizations and
institutions, location, transactions performed, and other
personal information. Moreover, agents carry out in-
teractions on behalf of their principals, so they ex-
change this personal information. Therefore, privacy
is of crucial importance in this kind of applications.
In this paper, we consider an electronic market
where seller agents and buyer agents trade wines on
behalf of their users. Seller agents act on behalf of
wine merchants. Buyer agents act on behalf of the
users that are willing to buy wines. As shown in Fig-
ure 5, each buyer agent can interact with any of the
seller agents that is available to buy wines. Moreover,
each agent is supposed to be running in a different In-
ternet location.
Agents in the e-marketplace follow the negotia-
tion protocol depicted in Figure 6 for each purchase
of a bottle of wine. A buyer agent makes a request
to buy a bottle of wine with a request message. This
message can be replied by the seller agent with either
a model message (which means that the requested
wine is available and includes its price) or an alterna-
tive message (which means that the requested wine
is not available but there is another one that is very
similar). Then, the buyer agent can reply to both
messages with: an accept message (which means that
the buyer agent accepts the wine offered), a quit mes-
sage (which means that the negotiation was broken by
the buyer agent), or a request message (which means
that the agent request a different bottle of wine).
We based on the wine attributes considered in
the preference modeling approach described in [55].
Thus, we consider the following attributes to describe
wines: color, body, flavor, sugar, and country. The
possible values for each of these attributes are shown
in Table 1.
6.1. Privacy
Privacy can be a great concern in this applica-
tion. This is because agents are subject to informa-
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Figure 5: Wines e-Marketplace
Attribute Values
Color red, rose, white
Body light, medium, full
Flavor delicate, moderate, strong
Sugar dry, offDry, sweet
Country France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, USA,
Germany, Australia, NewZeeland
Table 1: Considered Wine Attributes.
Figure 6: Negotiation Protocol for the Wine e-marketplace sce-
nario.
tion collection and processing. Specifically, agents
can exchange personal information when purchasing
bottles of wine. This information must be protected
from unauthorized parties, i.e., the information that
a seller agent and a buyer agent exchange in a pur-
chase should not be accessible for other agents in the
e-marketplace.
Regarding information processing, seller agents
could perform buyer profiling, i.e., seller agents ob-
tain detailed profiles of buyer agents and tailor their
offers regarding buyer agents’s tastes. Seller agents
could even charge buyer agents different prices for the
same wine according to the customers’ profiles (price
discrimination), i.e., if a seller agent knows that some
wine is of great interest to one buyer agent, the seller
agent could charge this customer more money for a
bottle of wine than other buyer agents for the very
same bottle of wine.
We assume that seller agents follow an approach
to build buyer agents’ preference profiles similar to
[56]. Over the course of a negotiation, the seller
agent marks wines that are not accepted by a buyer
agent as a negative instance (class ”-”), while a seller
agent marks the wine that the buyer agent accepts
to buy (i.e., the wine of the last step in the nego-
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tiation protocol) as a positive instance (class ”+”).
The seller agent use all the collected instances about
a buyer agent to train a statistical classifier. The
resulting trained classifier models the buyer agent’s
preferences with a given accuracy. Thus, the seller
agent has a detailed profile on what wines the buyer
agent likes/dislikes. Moreover, the seller agent can
use this profile in future purchases from the buyer
agent, e.g., the seller agent could then perform price
discrimination to a buyer agent with respect to an
item that the seller agent knows that is of great in-
terest for the buyer agent.
6.2. Trust and Reputation
Trust and reputation also play a crucial role in
this application. Buyer agents must be able to choose
among seller agents that sell the same wines. One of
the important dimensions that a buyer will take into
account in its decision is the trust it has in each seller
agent. This trust can be based on successful previous
purchases with the same seller agent. A buyer agent
can trust in a seller agent regarding past interactions
by measuring: whether or not the seller agent pro-
visioned the wine on time, the overall quality of the
wine bought, if there were hidden costs, etc. A buyer
agent can also trust in a seller agent regarding some
attributes of the seller agent’s partial identity in the
electronic market: registration date, corporate title,
skills, etc.
Another important dimension that a buyer agent
will take into account in its decision of buying a bottle
of wine is the reputation of the seller agent. This
is particularly useful when the buyer agent had no
previous transactions with a given seller agent. In
this case, it is not what an agent thinks of a given
seller agent but what it is generally said about the
seller agent in the e-marketplace.
In this scenario, malicious seller agents could take
advantage of the identity-related vulnerabilities of trust
and reputation models. Thus, seller agents should
not be able to get rid of their trust and reputation
assessments. This could cause important money loss.
For instance, a seller agent could ship bottles of wine
not on time. This obviously decreases the trust and
reputation that buyer agents have in this seller agent.
Hence, this seller agent decides to quit the electronic
market and re-entry into it with a new fresh identity,
restarting its trust and reputation assessments from
scratch. Another example would be a seller agent
which sell the same wines under different partial iden-
tities. In this sense, the probability that a buyer agent
chooses one of their partial identities as the provider
of the wine increases.
6.3. Accountability
As in many other applications, accountability must
be preserved. Moreover, accountability is even more
important in applications that involve commercial trans-
actions, such as the one that we present in this pa-
per. Indeed, the lack of accountability could cause
principals not to be willing to participate in the e-
marketplace. This is because if there is not a guaran-
tee that accountability will be preserved, principals
may be subject to many types of fraud. For instance,
a buyer agent could purchase a bottle of wine from a
seller agent. However, the seller agent may not ship
that bottle of wine. If we consider a great number of
bottles of wine (or a very expensive bottle of wine),
the seller agent’s principal should be sued for fraud.
Although the final punishment may depend on the
applicable laws for such a case, the important point
is that the principal behind the seller agent should be
completely identifiable.
7. Evaluation
In this section, we provide an extensive evaluation
of the support that Magentix2 provides for preserving
privacy based on the application we just presented in
the previous section. In particular, we test whether or
not information processing can be minimized by us-
ing the support that Magentix2 provides, whether or
not this support introduces a bearable performance
overhead, and whether or not existing trust and rep-
utation models can be implemented on top of Magen-
tix2. Finally, we also provide a discussion at the end
of this section in which we argument how Magentix2
complies with all of the stated requirements of the
application presented in Section 6 regarding privacy,
trust and reputation, and accountability.
7.1. Avoiding Information Processing
Our aim in this section is to experimentally demon-
strate that information processing, and thus, its pos-
sible undesired effects, can be minimized by chang-
ing RPIs. To this aim, we designed an experiment
in which 10 different buyer agents purchase bottles of
wine from a seller agent. The primary objective is for
buyer agents to avoid that the seller agent is capable
of obtaining a preference model from them.
12
As we explained in the previous section (Section
6), the seller agent trains an statistical classifier that
models buyer agents’ preferences (following the ap-
proach described in [56]). The statistical classifier
is trained considering instances that correspond to
wines that have been offered by the seller agent and
that buyer agents have either accepted or declined
during the negotiation protocol for a given purchase.
The resulting trained classifier models the buyer agents’
preferences with a given accuracy.
The aim of the experiment is to demonstrate that
changing RPIs can significantly reduce the accuracy
of the preference models obtained by the seller agent.
Therefore, the seller agent cannot take advantage of
these models to abuse buyer agents, e.g., perform-
ing price discrimination on buyer agents. In order
to prove that changing RPIs can reduce information
processing, we performed our experiment in which 10
buyer agent repeat 100 purchases of a bottle of wine
with a varying number of RPI changes. That is, buyer
agents start with 100 purchases and without any RPI
change and end up using a different RPI for each of
the 100 purchases. For each number of RPI changes
we calculate the accuracy of the resulting classifier.
For our experiment, we considered the parame-
ters that we sum up in Table 2. Each buyer agent
has different preferences with respect to the wines
that it likes. The specific preferences for each agent
are shown in Table 3. According to that preferences,
each buyer agent performs 100 different purchases of
a bottle of wine. Each purchase involves a negotia-
tion with a seller agent to get the desired wine. We
assume that negotiations are always successful. How-
ever, we consider that negotiations can randomly in-
volve from 1 up to 10 rounds of the protocol. That
is, we simulate negotiations on which a buyer agent
and a seller agent perform a maximum number of
10 rounds of the protocol. Based on this, a seller
agent marks wines that are not accepted by a buyer
agent as a negative instance (class ”-”), while a seller
agent marks the wine of the last step in the protocol
(i.e., the wine that the buyer agent accepts to buy)
as a positive instance (class ”+”). After the 100 pur-
chases, the seller agent use all the collected instances
about a buyer agent to train a classifier. We measure
the accuracy of the resulting trained classifier as the
percent of correctly classified instances from an extra
set of test instances (positive and negative) that we
generate according to the buyer preferences.
We implemented the seller agent so that it uses
Parameter Description Value
Ni # of interactions per negotiation 10
Nn # of negotiations 100
Nre # repetitions of the experiment 100
Nbu # of buyer agents 10
Nse # of seller agents 1
Alg Learning algorithms used J48, NNge,
BayesNet
Table 2: Parameters used in the privacy preservation experi-
ments.
Figure 7: Privacy Preservation when changing RPIs
a different classifier to obtain a model of the buyer
agents’ preferences based on the previous negotiations
with them. In this way, we repeat the overall exper-
iment to obtain the results regarding three different
classifiers. Specifically, we consider the same classi-
fiers as in [56]: the J48 decision tree algorithm (an im-
plementation of the C.45 algorithm), the NNge clas-
sification rules algorithm (Nearest neighbor like algo-
rithm using non-nested generalized exemplars) and
the BayesNet classifier that is a classifier based on
Bayesian networks.
Figure 7 shows the results obtained for our ex-
periment. These results are the average of the results
obtained for each individual buyer agent. We can
see that the percent of correctly classified instances
behaves very similar regardless of the learning algo-
rithm used. As expected, the more a buyer agent
changes its RPI, the less the accuracy of the learning
algorithms. In other words, the more a buyer agent
changes its RPI, the less the seller agent is able to
obtain a preference model of the buyer agent. There-
fore, buyer agents can avoid that the seller agent per-
forms information processing. Thus, it cannot make
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Agent Preferences
1 (body = light ∧ flavor = delicate)∨
(sugar = dry ∧ country = Portugal)
2 (color = red ∧ body = full ∧ flavor = strong)∨
(color = white ∧ body = light ∧ flavor = moderate)∨
(sugar = offDry ∧ country = Germany)
3 (sugar = sweet ∧ country = France)∨
(sugar = dry ∧ country = Spain)∨
(color = rose ∧ flavor = moderate)
4 (color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate)∨
(color = rose ∧ body = light ∧ sugar = dry)∨
(color = white ∧ body = full ∧ sugar = dry)
5 (color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate)∨
(color = rose ∧ body = full ∧ country = Italy)
6 (sugar = dry ∧ color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate ∧ country = France)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = white ∧ body = light ∧ flavor = delicate ∧ country = USA)
7 (sugar = dry ∧ color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate ∧ country = France)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = white ∧ body = light ∧ flavor = delicate ∧ country = USA)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = rose ∧ body = medium ∧ country = Portugal)
8 (sugar = dry ∧ color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate ∧ country = France)∨
(sugar = offDry ∧ color = white ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = delicate ∧ country = Australia)
9 (sugar = dry ∧ color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate ∧ country = France)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = white ∧ body = light ∧ flavor = delicate ∧ country = USA)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = rose ∧ body = medium ∧ country = Australia)
10 (sugar = dry ∧ color = red ∧ body = medium ∧ flavor = moderate ∧ country = France)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = white ∧ body = light ∧ flavor = delicate ∧ country = USA)∨
(sugar = sweet ∧ color = rose ∧ body = medium ∧ country = Portugal)∨
(sugar = offDry ∧ color = red ∧ body = full ∧ flavor = strong ∧ country = NewZeeland)
Table 3: Buyer agent’s preferences
any secondary use of the processed data.
Another remarkable phenomenon is that it seems
that there is a threshold in the number of RPI changes
(≈ 90 RPI changes) from which the accuracy of learn-
ing algorithms decreases at a faster rate. This rein-
forces the thesis of some privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies researchers that encourage users to change their
identities as often as possible. Moreover, it is clear
that the maximum privacy preservation is achieved
when buyer agents change their RPI for each new in-
teraction, which is known as transaction pseudonyms
in the privacy-enhancing technologies literature.
7.2. Performance Evaluation
In the previous section, we described an experi-
ment that demonstrates that changing RPIs can min-
imize information processing. However, changing RPIs
could also have costs associated to the change, e.g.,
a temporal cost. If this temporal cost is too high, it
could discourage agents from using the RPI change
capability offered by Magentix2. In this section, we
describe the experiment that we carried out in order
to evaluate the temporal cost of changing RPIs in the
Magentix2 agent platform.
We performed a similar experiment as the one pre-
sented in the previous section, in which agents change
their RPI a number of times in order to reduce infor-
mation processing. In this case, we only focus on two
agents, one buyer agent and one seller agent. More-
over, we do not calculate the accuracy of the prefer-
ence model that the seller obtains but we calculate
the temporal cost for the buyer to change its RPI
a specific number of times. This is in order to as-
certain whether or not it is temporally feasible for a
buyer agent to change their RPI as many times as
needed to prevent the seller agent from constructing
a detailed model on the buyer agent’s preferences.
We performed a simulation in which the buyer
agent carries out 100 different purchases of a bottle
of wine. Each purchase involves a negotiation with
the seller agent to get the desired wine. We assume
that negotiations are always successful. Moreover,
we consider that negotiations can randomly involve
from 1 up to 10 rounds of the protocol. The buyer
agent repeats the 100 purchases with a varying num-
ber of RPI changes. That is, the buyer agent starts
with 100 purchases and without any RPI change, and
it ends up using a different RPI for each of the 100
purchases (transaction pseudonyms). For each num-
ber of RPI changes we calculate the RTT time of the
messages exchanged between the buyer agent and the
seller agent.
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Figure 8: Location of the different components.
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Figure 9: Performance per number of RPI changes
In order for the experiment to be in an absolutely
controlled environment, we do not use any external
IdP but we use the IdP prototype described in [50]
as both the PIdP (the IdP that issues PPIs) and the
RIdP (the IdP that issues RPIs). Moreover, we used
3 PCs Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU @ 2.60GHz,
1GB RAM, Ubuntu 11.04 (x86 64) and Linux Kernel
2.6.38. The computers are connected to each other
via a 100Mb Ethernet switch. The security parame-
ters are the following: certificate keys are 1024 bits
RSA keys, SHA-1 hash function with 96-bit keys to
perform HMAC computations, and the saml2 tokens
to be issued by the IdP contain keys of 256 bits. The
location of the different components is shown in Fig-
ure 8: PC number 1 runs the Qpid Broker, the MMS,
the MCA, and the IdP; PC number 2 runs the buyer
agent; and finally, PC number 3 runs the seller agent.
Figure 9 shows the results obtained. These results
mean that changing a RPI has a temporal cost that is
linear with the number of changes to be made. These
results also mean that the temporal cost of a single
change is constant, and thus, it is not related to the
number of previously performed changes. Therefore,
we can claim that agents developed in Magentix2 can
minimize information processing about their princi-
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pals’ data (as shown in the previous section) without
incurring in a not affordable temporal cost. More-
over, as the cost of one single change is constant, a
buyer agent can predict in advance the temporal cost
of the changes it requires to reduce seller agents from
processing its data, and then, decide if it performs
the required changes or not.
7.3. Building Trust and Reputation
Finally, we also wanted to test whether trust and
reputation models can be implemented using partial
identities. The aim is to validate that agents in Ma-
gentix2 can use the trust and reputation model that
they prefer. Thus, if two agents establish trust or rep-
utation trough permanent partial identities, identity-
related vulnerabilities are avoided because IdPs do
not allow agents to change their permanent partial
identity.
We implemented one seller agent and three buyer
agents. Each buyer agent uses its own trust and repu-
tation machinery to model the trustworthiness of the
seller agent based on the previous interactions and
the personal attributes of the seller agent. The PPIs
issued by the PIdP take values for two attributes:
name and role. Both seller agents and buyer agents
register into the system using the PPI that the PIdP
issued for them – so that the system does not know
the real identity of the legal person that agents are
acting on behalf of. In this way, buyer agents are able
to identify providers from previous interactions and
build their own trust and reputation models, being
sure that the seller agent will not be able to hold any
other PPI.
The seller agent follows a normal distribution with
a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to model
whether it carries out the service requested in the
way that buyer agents expect it. In this sense, when
a buyer agent requests a service to the seller, if the
value returned is in the interval [-1,1], the buyer agent
considers that the seller performed as expected. If the
value returned is out of this interval the buyer agent
considers that the seller agent did not perform as ex-
pected. When the seller agent performs as expected,
the buyer agent rates it with 1. When the seller agent
does not perform as expected, the buyer agent rates
it with 0. These ratings are inputs of the trust and
reputation model each buyer agent has.
Each buyer agent runs a different trust and repu-
tation model that is fed using past interactions with
the seller agent and attributes from the seller agent’s
Figure 10: Trust values for the seller agent obtained by each
trust model (implemented by each buyer agent).
partial identity. We implemented three models (each
one for each buyer agent), one simply using a mean
of all the previous performances to compute a trust
value, one using the SinAlpha trust model [57] that
considers previous interactions, and finally, one us-
ing the Fire trust and reputation model [58] which
uses, among other information, previous interactions
and the role of the agents to be trusted. Figure 10
presents trust values for each buyer after 100 inter-
actions with the seller agent. These trust values are
the result of each buyer agent’s trust and reputation
model given the results of the interactions with the
seller agent. We can observe that the trust models
perform as expected and the tendency is very similar
in all of the models implemented . This tendency cor-
responds to whether or not the seller agent performs
as buyers expect. Thus, we can conclude that the
trust models considered can be implemented using
partial identities.
7.4. Discussion
The agent-based e-marketplace for wine applica-
tion benefits from the features that Magentix2 pro-
vides for preserving privacy and accountability as well
as avoiding identity-related vulnerabilities of trust
and reputation. Magentix2 provides support for pre-
serving privacy by means of mechanisms that can be
used by agents to avoid information collection and
processing.
Regarding information collection, the information
that a buyer agent and a seller agent exchange is con-
fidential. To this aim, Magentix2 is in charge of auto-
matically generating a X.509 certificate for each agent
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partial identity so that they can communicate trough
SSL. Therefore, communications are encrypted from
one agent to another so that the information con-
tained in such communications cannot be accessed
by any other unauthorized agent.
Regarding information processing, buyer agents
can hold multiple RPIs. Therefore, they can avoid
information processing as shown in Section 7.1. In-
deed, the most privacy preserving option is for buyer
agents to change their RPIs for each different pur-
chase of a bottle of wine. Moreover, as shown in Sec-
tion 7.2, RPI changes come at a bearable efficiency
cost. Thus, agents can change their RPIs without an
important efficiency penalty.
In Section 7.3, we demonstrate that trust and
reputation models can be implemented using partial
identities. Buyers and sellers are able to authenticate
their partial identities (both PPIs and RPIs). There-
fore, they are allowed to recognize to each other from
interaction to interaction and establish trust and rep-
utation relationships. Moreover, if trust and reputa-
tion is established using PPIs, identity-related vulner-
abilities of trust and reputation models are avoided.
This is due to the fact that there is no chance for a
buyer or a seller to have two different PPIs.
Finally, accountability is preserved. IdPs conceal
real identities. Therefore, both Magentix2 and the
rest of the agents are a priori not able to link a given
partial identity (PPI or RPI) to the corresponding
original real identity. However, if an agent misbe-
haves when using one of its partial identities (PPI or
RPI), a court could require the IdP that issued the
partial identity to disclose the real identity that is
behind the partial identity. For instance, if an agent
performs fraud, the real identity of its principal could
be known so that this principal can be sued for fraud.
8. Related Work
8.1. Privacy-enhancing Agent Platforms
There are many Agent Platforms (APs) developed
by the agent community [2]. However, only a few of
them currently take security concerns into account.
For instance, Jade [59], Magentix12 [60], AgentScape
[61], SECMAP [62], Tryllian ADK [63], Cougaar [64],
12Note that the support we present in this paper is for Ma-
gentix2, which is a completely redesigned version of Magentix
[60].
SeMoA [65], and Voyager [66] are security-concerned
APs.
Current security-concerned APs provide confiden-
tiality for the messages exchanged by the agents run-
ning on top of them. To this aim, APs use existing se-
cure data transfer technologies such as Kerberos [26],
SSL [27], and TLS [28]. These technologies allow the
encryption of messages before transferring them and
the decryption of messages once they are received. As
a result, if an agent A sends a message to an agent B
using these technologies, A is sure that B will be the
only one able to read this message.
Confidentiality is a necessary condition to pre-
serve privacy, it can prevent information collection
but it is not sufficient to prevent information pro-
cessing. Only a few of the security-concerned APs ex-
plained above implement some kind of support to pre-
vent information processing. Specifically, only Ma-
gentix, Secmap, AgentScape, and Cougaar allow agents
to authenticate each other using their unique agent
identity. With this identity, agents can act pseudony-
mously, i.e., agents can act on behalf of their principal
without using the identity of their principal. How-
ever, agents cannot hold more than one pseudonym,
i.e., principals should use a different agent each time
they want to use a different pseudonym.
Warnier and Brazier [67] also present a mecha-
nism for the AgentScape AP that offers pseudonymity
by means of what they call handles. Handles are
pseudonyms that agents can use to send/receive mes-
sages to/from other agents. At will, agents can re-
quest new handles to the AP. Moreover, the AP is the
only one that knows the association between handles
and GUIDs (global unique identities of the agents).
An agent can also obtain anonymity by simply us-
ing a different handle for each transaction (transac-
tion pseudonyms). AgentScape also offers an auto-
matic anonymity service. Agents can send messages
anonymously without having to manage pseudonyms.
This service is provided by agents called anonymiz-
ers. When an agent wants to send a message anony-
mously, this message is redirected to an anonymizer.
Then, this anonymizer is in charge of removing the
original handle of the sender from the message, re-
placing it with another (possibly new) handle, and
sending the message to the intended recipient. If
the intended recipient replies, this reply is forwarded
to the sender of the original message. The original
sender of the message must notify when a transac-
tion ends. For each new transaction the anonymizer
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generates a new handle.
APs that provide support for pseudonymity (e.g.
by providing APIs to create and manage pseudonyms)
do not consider that pseudonyms can be issued by ex-
ternal third parties. That is, APs themselves are in
charge of issuing the pseudonyms. Thus, the AP itself
(and the anonymizer agents for the case of AgentScape)
knows the relationship of pseudonyms to each other
and to the principal involved. This usually implies
that the organization or company that hosts the spe-
cific system (e.g. eBay in the case of an e-marketplace)
knows the association of pseudonyms to each other
and to principals. Therefore, information processing
could still be easy. In Magentix2 partial identities are
issued by IdPs, and then, these partial identities are
used in Magentix2. Therefore, identity management
is decoupled from the system where the identities are
to be used. Note that this may not completely pre-
vent information processing. There is still the possi-
bility that an agent running on Magentix2 or Magen-
tix2 itself could collude with some of the IdPs in order
to be able to link a partial identity to its correspond-
ing real identity. However, agents could (partially)
address this by obtaining different partial identities
from different IdPs so as to decrease the probability
of being traced back in case of collusion.
Finally, there are also approaches that have been
implemented on top of APs that by themselves do
not provide support to avoid information collection
and processing. In this way, Lee et al. [68] present
an approach based on P3P13 for the Jade AP. The
privacy-enhancing agent (PEA) is in charge of auto-
matically retrieving P3P policies of service providers
and evaluates whether or not these policies are com-
pliant with its principal’s policy. When a principal
attempts to access a website, PEA automatically re-
trieves the website P3P policy and compares it to its
principal’s preferences. If PEA detects potential pri-
vacy violations (i.e., the principal’s preferences and
the website’s P3P policy do not match) or is unable to
read the policy of the website, it notifies its principal
so that the principal can decide to desist in accessing
the website. This approach does not consider that a
website may not comply with its announced policy,
and, thus, principals’ privacy breaches are still possi-
ble. Moreover, this approach is not a generic support
from the AP and may not be suitable in other do-
13The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 http://www.w3.
org/TR/P3P/
mains.
8.2. Accountability Preservation
Secure APs that do not provide support for pseudonymity
(such as Jade [59], Tryllian ADK [63], SeMoA [65],
and Voyager [66]) usually preserve accountability. This
is because they base authentication on the the iden-
tity of the agents’ users. Therefore, the identity of
the agents’ users is always available. If an agent mis-
behaves, its users identity can be known.
Accountability is more difficult in secure APs that
provide support for pseudonymity (such as Magen-
tix [60], Secmap [62], AgentScape [61], and Cougaar
[64]). This is because these APs authenticate based
on the identity (pseudonym) of the agents. Thus, the
identity of the corresponding user may not be known.
In order to avoid a lack of accountability that could
cause a sense of impunity and encourage abuse, Ma-
gentix and AgentScape keep track of the association
between principals and pseudonyms.
Magentix2 does not keep track of the associa-
tion between principals and pseudonyms. It relies on
trusted external identity providers to keep this infor-
mation. However, accountability is preserved because
these trusted external identity providers can reveal
the corresponding real identities for law enforcement.
8.3. Identity-related vulnerabilities of Trust and Rep-
utation Models
There have been some different approaches in the
related literature to tackle identity-related vulnera-
bilities of trust and reputation [69]. There is one
approach that bases on adding a monetary cost for
entering a given system [49]. Thus, an potential ma-
licious agent would have a sufficient incentive (if the
fee is high enough compared to the benefit expected)
not to re-entry the system with a new identity. The
main problem of this approach is that if the cost for
entering the particular system is too high, even po-
tentially benevolent agents may choose not to enter
the system because of the high cost associated to it.
Yu et al. [70] present an approach based on so-
cial networks represented as a graph in which nodes
represent pseudonyms and edges represent human-
established trust relationships among them in the
real world. They claim that malicious users can cre-
ate many pseudonyms but few trust relationships.
They exploit this property to bound the number of
pseudonyms to be considered for trust and reputa-
tion. However, this approach is not appropriate for
18
open MAS in which agents act on behalf of principals
that may not be known in the real world.
There is another approach that consist of reputa-
tion models specifically designed to meet some math-
ematical properties that are proved to avoid identity-
related vulnerabilities. For instance, Cheng et al.
[71] have demonstrated several conditions using graph
theory that must be satisfied when calculating repu-
tation in order for reputation models to be resilient
to sybil attacks. The only drawback of this kind of
approaches is that they usually need a particular and
specific way to calculate reputation ratings about an
individual. Thus, this approach cannot be applied to
reputation models that follow other approaches for
managing reputation ratings.
Magentix2 follows a different approach, it bases
on completely avoiding the possibility for agents to
change their identity. In this way, agents can only
hold one PPI for a given system. Therefore, when
trust and reputation are established trough PPIs, agents
cannot get rid of the trust and reputation ratings they
got from other agents in the system.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, we present the support that the
Magentix2 AP provides for enhancing privacy in the
applications built on top of it. This support also al-
lows agents to avoid identity-related vulnerabilities of
trust and reputation models. Moreover, this support
avoids the lack of accountability of the principals in-
volved. All these features are crucial for encouraging
principals’ trust in agent-based applications.
We experimentally show that the support that
Magentix2 provides can be used for agents to min-
imize information processing. Moreover, we demon-
strate that the efficiency cost of changing a RPI is ab-
solutely bearable. Finally, we also demonstrate that
current trust and reputation models can be imple-
mented in Magentix2 by implementing some of them.
Agents running on Magentix2 can use the sup-
port it provides to enhance privacy while preserving
accountability and avoiding identity-related vulnera-
bilities of trust and reputation at will depending on
their principals’ needs. An agent can create as many
RPIs as needed to avoid information processing. Oth-
erwise, an agent can use a PPI if it is interested in
building trust and reputation. Thus, other agents
can trust in this agent while being sure that it can-
not perform whitewashing and sibyl attacks because
PPI cannot be changed.
As future work, we would like to explore the pos-
sibility of agents automatically deciding whether or
not they change their RPI for their next interaction.
This decision may be based on the privacy that is to
be lost if the RPI is not changed (e.g., an estimation
of the model that other agents could have about their
preferences) and the possible benefits of not changing
the RPI. In particular, the decision of whether or not
changing a RPI could be based on disclosure decision
making models that consider a tradeoff between the
privacy that is lost and the benefit of doing so, such
as privacy-utility tradeoff models [72] and privacy-
intimacy tradeoff models [73].
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